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INTRODUCTION
Last year's conference  examined  "harmonization,  convergence  and compati-
bility"  of the agricultural  policies  of the  NAFTA  countries  (Loyns et al,  eds.  1997).
Some, though not complete,  progress was made towards achieving a common under-
standing and  usage  of these  concepts.  This  year the subject  is  "economic harmoni-
zation."  What do we mean by this?  In this paper, it is taken as an abbreviation  for
"economic integration and policy harmonization."
Discussion in the workshop and papers to this point has focused on structural
adjustments occurring in the Mexican,  U.S. and Canadian  grain-livestock subsectors,
with some reference  to their causes,  and to their implications  for international  com-
petitiveness, in each case. Technological change,  market changes and policy changes
are all seen as major determinants  of structural change in the agri-food industry. We
believe  it is important to recognize  the simultaneous  relationship  between  structure
and policy: Structural change can influence  policy, while policy is also a determinant
of the economic structure of industry.
Our task, with the focus restricted to the grain-livestock subsectors,  is to build
on the outcome of last year's workshop  in identifying the major issues surrounding,
and  opportunities  for,  policy  harmonization  among  NAFTA  countries,  and  to  say
something about the implications of these for further structural changes  in these agri-
food sectors.1 The most fundamental issue, addressed first, is whether policy harmo-
nization  is  necessary  or  desirable.  We  conclude  that  it  is  both.  Our  subsequent
sections  briefly review progress to date with policy harmonization,  point to institu-
tional factors which will continue the drive toward greater harmonization in coming
1For the purposes of this workshop, we take  "grain-livestock" to exclude dairy and poultry/eggs, and to include
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years, identify opportunities for further  harmonization,  and discuss the implications
of coming structural changes in the grain and livestock sector for the policy harmoni-
zation agenda. Our major conclusions complete the paper.
The  concept  of international  policy harmonization,  while more  prominent  in
recent  years,  is  not  that new.  A  general  recommendation  of the Canadian  Federal
Task  Force  on Agriculture  in  1969  (p.60)  was that  "domestic  farm  policy  must be
made consistent with changing international  developments".2
WHY PURSUE  POLICY HARMONIZATION?
Global  economic  integration  is  proceeding  irreversibly,  driven  by  techno-
logical  change  (particularly  in communications  and  transportation),  the  removal  of
impediments  to international  capital flows  and to  trade in goods and services,  and
the evolution of international  standards, global monetary markets, and multinational
enterprises.  Regional  economic  integration  can  be expected  to  proceed even  faster.
These  developments  imply a  gradual  loss  of national  economic  sovereignty,  and  a
growing  need  for  cooperative  management  of the  international  economy  (Bonnen,
et al).  They should be taken as givens, unable to  be reversed by unilateral  actions of
any country, even the United  States.3
Government  attempts to regulate  the  operations  of multinational enterprises
in  their  own  territory  can  result  in  the  relocation  of  their  activities  elsewhere.
Furthermore, when  consumers'  welfare  doesn't  seem  to count for much politically,
and when producers'  surplus may accrue to  owners or shareholders  in  other coun-
tries,  analysis  of whether  a country's  own interests  lie with  one  or  another  policy
option  becomes  increasingly  blurred.  Much  of our  existing  economic  welfare  and
trade theory seems to be falling behind reality in this respect.
Recent years  have witnessed processed  products  comprising  a growing pro-
portion of international  agricultural product trade. In contrast to global commerce  in
agricultural commodities where trade dominates and foreign direct investment (FDI)
is small,  FDI is the  dominant form of international  commerce in processed  foods.  In
one  sample  of  144  food  processing  firms  worldwide,  sales  from  foreign  affiliates
exceeded exports from home countries by a ratio of 5 to  1 (Henderson et al,  1996).  The
(U.S.)  Council for Agricultural  Science  and Technology  (CAST) reported in  1995  that
the  20 largest U.S.  food sector multinationals  were  14.7 times more  likely to reach a
foreign  market  through  a  foreign  affiliate  than  through  exports  from  the
United  States.  West  and Vaughan  (1995)  examined  bilateral  U.S./Canada  food  and
beverage  trade  and  found  similar  though  less  dramatic  numbers.  The  latter  also
noted that a substantial portion  of Canada's trade  (55 percent  of imports; 35  percent
of exports)  is intra-firm trade.
2Interestingly,  that  same  Report  also  recommended,  more  specifically,  that  "the primary  trade goal  of Canada
should  be  to  negotiate  a  free  trade  Continental  Market  with  the  United  States  for  livestock  and  livestock
products,  feed  grains, oilseeds,  potatoes and  some fruits  and vegetables."  Food grains, and  other commodities,
were apparently  seen by the Task Force to be excluded from  such an arrangement.
3We do not  mean to imply that we think it  is likely that the U.S. would in future decide  to pursue such a reversal.
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New  theories  of  trade  under  conditions  of  imperfect  competition  help  to
explain the  motivation of firms to engage in FDI. However,  they seem to be still ina-
dequate  in identifying  the relative  national  interests  in FDI versus trade, or in  mea-
suring  trade  benefits  when  the  exporting  firm  is  foreign  rather  than  domestically
owned.  Certainly,  barriers  to international  investment  flows  and  national  compe-
tition policies  seem to be more  relevant than  trade policies  in affecting  this form  of
international  commerce.  Such measures  are  less likely  to  be commodity-specific  or
even agriculture-specific  than trade measures.  Hedley  (1997)  identified  a wide range
of policies  other than  agri-food  policies  (e.g.,  taxation,  labour,  education,  environ-
mental,  social,  etc.)  that affect the  investment  and location  decisions of food  sector
firms. For these reasons there appears to be a growing international  acceptance  that,
lacking  clear  criteria  for the  success  of national  regulatory  policies,  it  is  better  for
governments to respond only to clear cases  of market failure.
Regardless  of the  inevitability  of global  integration,  most countries  are  per-
suaded that, on balance,  globalization  and multilateral  free trade are to their benefit;
i.e.,  that the gains  from trade  are real.  NAFTA  countries  have  a common interest  in
achieving  reductions  in agricultural  protection  and  support  in third countries,  and
are willing to pay the price of reducing their own tariffs and  "coupled"  support that
such  reductions  would  entail.  International  agreements  for  freer  trade  inevitably
imply  a greater degree  of harmonization  of trade  policies. The extent to which  they
also necessitate  harmonization  of other broad economic policies has been the subject
of theoretical debate for some time (e.g., see Johnson,  1972, Ch. 16).  Practical evidence
suggests  that,  in the  face  of  free trade  and  functioning  regional  and  international
markets,  differences  in national  policies become,  at best,  a nuisance  or, at  worst,  a
serious political irritant.
Major grain-livestock  policy differences  between NAFTA  countries in the past
have occurred in the area of farm price support and  "coupled"  income  support pro-
grams.  Progressively,  CUSTA,  NAFTA  and  the  Uruguay  Round4 ,  in  combination
with a severe  fiscal imperative for most governments in the  1990s, have done much to
narrow  these  differences  (see  also  next  section).  As  such,  support  is  reduced  in
magnitude  in  all countries,  due to  negotiated reductions  in the level  of border  pro-
tection or due to fiscal restraint,  then differences in the nature of that support become
less important.  Whether  a  "level playing  field"  is possible  in  the  face  of  different
types of support in  different countries becomes less subject  to dispute as the  "level"
approaches  bedrock.
However,  not all policies cost governments more money than they are willing
to spend or are  indirectly disciplined  by trade agreements.  The  perception,  by pro-
ducers in any one country, about whether the "playing field is level" will also depend
41t may be prudent to add "the next WTO negotiations"  to this list, recognizing  that most governments don't like
to be seen to be giving in to international  pressure, and prefer to position themselves,  by unilateral  action,  to stay
ahead of international  commitments.  By having made  only minor use of export subsidies  and no deficiency pay-
ments  for several  years,  the United  States, for  example,  could argue  for the elimination  of both the  "blue box"
and  agricultural  export subsidies  in the next round, and be argued  to have already been  affected by this antici-
pated outcome.
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on the nature and cost  of other countries'  interventions in  areas outside the scope  of
constraints  imposed  by trade  agreements.  And  good  hemispheric  relations  in  the
broad  sense  are  usually  seen  by  governments  as  much  too  important  to  be  held
hostage  by  agricultural  disputes.  Thus,  governments  may  seek  to  lay  the
groundwork  for  broader policy  goals  by pursuing agri-food  policy  harmonization.
Establishing  the  perception  of equitable  treatment  under policies  and programs  in
areas such as crop insurance,  disaster payments, conservation, floor price safety nets,
decoupled  income support, pesticide licensing  and marketing legislation  and regula-
tions can facilitate  addressing broader policy issues in non-agricultural  areas.
Another justification for harmonization  derives simply from the difficulties  of
achieving  smoothly  functioning  regional  and  global  markets  when  grades  and
standards  and  other  regulations  differ  between  countries.  Rail  rates,  variety  regis-
tration/licensing,  container  sizes, labeling,  customs procedures,  grade specifications
(wheat, malting barley, beef,  pork), and permitted  pesticide residue levels all provide
examples  where  scope  exists  for more  uniformity  of regulation,  to  mutual benefit,
among NAFTA countries in the grain-livestock sector.
We conclude  that policy harmonization  is not only desirable,  but that it will
become  increasingly necessary in the emerging agri-food  system.
PROGRESS  TOWARD  HARMONIZATION
In discussing, in  1998, grain-livestock policy harmonization,  it is important to
recognize  that much  has  already  been  achieved  in  recent  years.  Casco  (1997)  pro-
vided a useful summary of the very ambitious Mexican agricultural policy reforms of
the  past fifteen years.  Most  importantly,  Mexico's  reform  of its domestic  corn price
support  program  in  the  late  1980s  allowed  it  to  take  on  the  related  trade  barrier
reduction  commitments  required  by  NAFTA,  creating  the  possibility  of  market-
determined feed grain imports, and removing a major discrepancy  between its grain
policy and  those  of its northern trading  partners.  At the  same time,  Mexico's  com-
mitment to NAFTA provided  a guarantee that its domestic  policy reforms  could only
be  reversed  at  a  political  and  economic  cost  that  would  probably  be  prohibitive.
Under  the  PROCAMPO  program,  major  crop  price  supports  are  being  gradually
replaced  with  direct  payment  support,  based  on fixed  per  hectare  payments,  and
decoupled  from  production  conditions.  The  introduction  of  hedging  activities  by
Mexican  Government  agencies-on behalf of Mexican  producers  collectively,  using
U.S.  commodity exchanges as a means to achieving  a degree  of stability in producer
prices-is an important innovation.
The  United  States  never  provided  a  significant  level  of  direct  commodity
support  for  oilseeds, pork  and beef.  Beginning  with the  1985  farm  legislation,  with
further  steps  in  1990  and  1996,  U.S.  cereal  expenditures  have  been made  progres-
sively more decoupled,  and price support a progressively  less  important component
of total cereal support.  Target prices and deficiency payments represented the core of
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U.S. crop  policy, and  their  elimination, in  1995,  ranked  in relative  national signifi-
cance  with the departure  from  corn price support in Mexico,  and also removed the
"budget offset" argument for proponents of grains export subsidies  (IATRC).
Canadian  government  spending in  the red meats and grains support areas is
now running  at only  a fraction  of peak levels  reached in the  late  1980s,  and  many
major programs (WGSA, GRIP, WGTA, FFA, ASA and some other short-lived ad hoc
programs)  have  been eliminated. 5 Repeated  U.S. countervailing  actions over  time
have  turned Canadian  pork  and, particularly,  beef producers  against  subsidy  pro-
grams. Tariff protection for beef has been made  equal with that of the United States
(from  1994)  and  beef producers  have  even declined  to participate  in the  new  non-
commodity-specific  Net Income Stabilization Account  (NISA) program, even though
it has been judged to be exempt from countervailing action under U.S. law. The elimi-
nation, subsequent to the Uruguay Round, of the western grains transportation sub-
sidies, which  were  effectively  export  subsidies, removed  another  policy  quite dif-
ferent  from the  closest  U.S.  equivalent  (Export  Enhancement  Program  [EEP]),  and
which  happened  to also  cause a  major downward  distortion  to beef and  pork pro-
duction, and other grains processing activities, in the prairie region.
Cereal grain  seems to be the one  grain-livestock  commodity area to continue
to exhibit glaring and contentious differences  between remaining Canadian  and U.S.
policies  (elaborated  further  in  our next  section).  However,  even  here  considerable
progress  has  been  recorded.  Access  of  U.S.  suppliers  to  the  Canadian  marketing
system is now restricted much less than previously The last few years have seen U.S.
grain moving  to port on the Canadian rail system. The planned acquisition of Illinois
Central by C.N. Rail appears to bring closer the movement of some Canadian grain to
export through U.S.  Gulf ports.  Canadian rail freight rate  deregulation  is reportedly
close to going ahead. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's evolution from a pure coope-
rative  to  a  public  company,  together  with  its  diversification  into  a  much  broader
range  of economic  interests, makes  it look much  more like  some  of the  large  U.S.-
based private-sector companies, and may provide a lead which other Canadian grain
cooperatives  will  follow.6 Some  progress  has  occurred  in  'lengthening  the  arm'
between  the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and the Canadian  Government: Bill C-4,
now before  the Canadian  Parliament, encompasses several revisions to the Canadian
Wheat Board Act.
In  the regulatory  area,  there  has  been considerable  collaboration,  over time,
between the  U.S. and  Canada in moving towards more similarity in pork, beef and
grain  grading  systems.  While  still  not  fully  compatible  (e.g.,  Canada  retains  its
"index"  system for hogs which rewards  leanness),  all are more so than they used to
be.7 Furthermore,  the scope for Canadian  farmers to contract for supplies according
to buyers' own specifications is gradually increasing (e.g., the relaxation of obligatory
hog marketing through monopoly cooperative marketing boards in many provinces).
5Acronyms  used  here:  WGSA  - Western  Grains  Stabilization  Act;  GRIP  - Gross  Revenue  Insurance Program;
WGTA -Western Grains Transportation  Act; FFA -Feed Freight Assistance;  ASA -Agricultural Stabilization Act.
6Merger  discussions  between the  Manitoba  Pool Elevators  and  the  Alberta  Wheat Pool  were reported  in  the
Toronto Globe and Mail of 22 April,  1998.
McClatchy and Schweikhardt 261Grain-Livestock Harmonization
It is evident that some harmonization has  been achieved  by amputation (e.g.,
Canadian  transport  subsidies  and  U.S.  deficiency  payments)  and  other  by recons-
tructive surgery  (ongoing changes to the CWB and evolution of the NISA program  in
Canada). In general, the oilseeds, pork and beef areas are now relatively trouble-free.
Major  remaining  grains/livestock  policy  harmonization  issues  are  confined  to the
area of cereal grains.
MAJOR OUTSTANDING  INSTITUTIONAL  ISSUES
At  least  three  aspects  of  existing  U.S.  policies  cause  concern  for  Canadian
grains farmers. One is that direct payments to U.S. crop farmers remain high, that the
planned  phase  out over  seven years of a major  part of these  remains uncertain and
potentially  reversible  by Congress,  and that,  although  much  more decoupled  than
previously,  such  payments  can  never  be  fully  decoupled. 8 A  second  is that  grain
export subsidies  (EEP),  and 'permanent'  U.S. farm legislation dating from  the  1930s,
remain  'on  the books', even though not currently used. Absent a policy about-face in
this regard by the United States,  these first two concerns are likely to lessen with the
passage of time. Canada can still be expected to do its utmost in multilateral negotia-
tions beginning  in  1999 to  eliminate the possibility of the  use of export  subsidies by
the United States.  The latter country may be ready to make this commitment at that
time,  subject to  obtaining  the same commitment  from all other  countries. The third
concern  is U.S.  export credit  guarantee programs, particularly  GSM  103 which, with
its  long  (up  to  10  year)  repayment  provisions,  goes  well  beyond  what  all  other
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries  have
agreed to be appropriate for most agricultural products.
The continued existence of the CWB is certain to be the major Canadian thorn
in the  side of the United  States  in the grain-livestock  area.  As  a state trading enter-
prise  it  is  one  of  a number  of  international  targets,  including  the  state  importing
agencies  of large markets like China,  Japan and Russia, and other  major single-desk
exporters,  such as the New  Zealand  Dairy  Board  and the  Australian  Wheat Board.
The United  States  is expected  to  make state trading agencies  a priority issue  in  the
next  round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  It  seems  very  likely  that  other
monopoly exporters  (e.g., the Australian Wheat Board or New Zealand  Dairy Board)
will be radically changed in coming years, increasing the pressure for the  CWB to be
similarly modified  (Dobson, 1998).
7Some analysts question the relevance  of national grading systems and suggest that they will become  redundant
in the  future as  "designer  commodities"  proliferate.  Martin  (1994),  for  example,  notes that large loin  eyes and
absence of "PSE"  (pale, soft exudative)  in pork both  have considerable  market value, but neither is rewarded  by
Canada's hog grading system.
8Although  lower  than  payments  in  the  peak  support  years  of the  1980s,  U.S.  crop  producer  payments  have
declined proportionately less than Canadian crop producer payments since that period, and Canadian producers
are well aware  that these U.S. payments are currently higher than they would  have been had the pre-1996  legis-
lation continued.-~~~clth  ndShekad  6
From  a  competitive  perspective,  the  relative  lack  of  transparency  sur-
rounding  the  Board's  operations  is  a  source  of  suspicion  (about  possible  hidden
government subsidies and/or other unfair advantages)  and concern to U.S interests.
It is difficult  to envisage  U.S. pressure  diminishing on this issue until the CWB loses
its monopoly status,  is made completely independent  of the Canadian  government,
and operates with a degree  of transparency comparable to large private sector grain
marketing  enterprises.  A  Toronto  Globe  and  Mail  editorial  recently  (3 Feb.  1998)
pointed out that the CWB is one of the few Canadian  federal institutions not subject
to the  Access  to  Information  Act or  the scrutiny of the Auditor  General.  It charac-
terizes Bill C-4  (1998)  as  "leaving the Wheat Board  as it has always  been: a secretive
monopoly".  Ironically,  the  fact  that  the  CWB  existed  in  recent years,  and  acted  to
restrain Canadian  grain flows  into the  U.S. market, probably resulted  in some  price
benefits for U.S. grains producers  and lower fiscal costs of EEP expenditures.
The  CWB  provides  intraseasonal  price  pooling  for Western  Canadian  grain
producers.  With the hedging opportunities  now available  to farmers,  this feature  is
probably  of less  value than  it  once  was,  and  undoubtedly  is a  deterrent  to  use  of
hedging  by Canadian  grains  producers. 9 Similarly,  if and  as  targeted  export  sub-
sidies and  state trading by other countries  (which serve  to segment export  markets
and create artificial  price  differentials)  are phased out  in the future,  another current
justification for the CWB's existence will be weakened.
Both the United States and Canada provide minimum effective producer price
schemes for wheat and barley, which, although distinct in nature,  are similar in effect,
at  least  for  producers. 1 '  The  U.S.  "loan rate"  price  corresponds  to  the  Canadian
"initial payments"  price. Both prices have been maintained  at conservative  levels in
recent  years,  and  have  not  influenced  farmers'  returns  in either  country  for  some
years.  However,  in the  event  of  a major  decline  in world market  prices,  U.S.  pro-
ducers would be assured of receiving at least the loan price, as loans may be repaid at
market prices if these are lower than the loan rate. In Canada, the federal government
still finances  any  "pool deficit"  between  the average  CWB sale  price for  the season
(less  marketing  costs)  and  the  announced  "initial  price".  The  inconsistency  arises
because  the  U.S.  loan  rates  are  formula-based  on  5-year  moving average  historic
prices  (though also  subject to legislated  upper  limits)  whereas  the  Canadian  initial
prices are based  on market prospects for the coming season. There  are also elements
of price forecast signaling and advance payments in the Canadian  mechanism.
The  differences  between  the  two  countries  grain  grading  systems  are  the
source of several other inconsistencies throughout the whole grain marketing system
in operation  in  each country. In both countries grading  is based  on visual characte-
ristics. In Canada,  unlike the  U.S.,  only varieties which  are visually distinguishable
are licensed for use. In effect,  it is probably accepted  on both sides of the border that
the  Canadian  system,  administered  by  the  Canadian  Grain  Commission  (CGC),
9 It may also be  a deterrent to the development of the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange.
10Note that,  while guaranteeing  minimum prices  to  producers,  neither  of these schemes  as currently  operated
provides a floor support to respective domestic market prices.
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results in more consistency in the delivered  product.l1 This superior consistency and
reliability  of the Canadian  product is valued by some buyers  and gives rise to a reco-
gnized  premium  for Canadian  grain, relative  to  the price paid for the same average
quality grain from the United States, in some overseas markets.12 Naturally,  this is an
advantage  which  Canadians  are  loathe  to abandon.  Unfortunately,  maintenance  of
the integrity of the Canadian system requires that, to the extent that visually indistin-
guishable varieties are imported, care must be taken to ensure that they be segregated
from Canadian  export grain in the process  of elevation and transportation.  Thus the
different grading mechanism  gives rise to a whole set of regulations  and restrictions
in  grain  production  and  marketing  in  Canada  which  are  not  present  in  the
United States.  These  differences  have their costs.  A simulation study  by Wilson  and
Johnson  (1995)  found,  for  example,  that  relaxing  variety  release  requirements  or
increasing  the  use  of  contracting,  to  allow  greater  production  of  6RW  barleys  in
Canada,  would generate  increased  Canadian  penetration  of the  U.S.  malting  barley
market and higher grower prices.
The  CWB could  be argued  to have  been ahead  of its time in  historically  pro-
viding  a product  very  carefully  controlled  and  designed  for  the  needs  of  its  cus-
tomers.  Unfortunately,  it has focused its attention on just one group of customers for
milling  wheat  (those  seeking  high  quality bread  wheat)  to  the  exclusion  of others,
and  in  so  doing  may  have  discouraged  or  prevented  the  production  in  Western
Canada of other wheat more suited to the needs  of other potential  customers.  It  has
been suggested that,  as a consequence,  in an average  year it must market more high
quality  bread  wheat  than  the  premium  export  markets  for  this  type of wheat  can
absorb, with the result that much of the high quality crop must be sold at a discount.
Apart from generating accusations of discriminatory  or even predatory pricing, such
an outcome  also represents  a loss for Canadian  farmers who,  in theory, could  have
been serving  such markets with higher-yielding lower-quality wheat for greater eco-
nomic  gain.  In  addition  the  low  rate  of  historic  gain  in  Canadian  wheat yields  is
claimed by some to reflect the constraint placed  on Canadian wheat breeders by the
visual distinguishability  requirement of the licensing system.
Crop  insurance  and  disaster  expenditures,  although  not  identical,  are
probably viewed  as  comparable  enough  to  not give  rise to  serious  concerns  in the
other country. U.S.  conservation  expenditures,  although relatively much higher than
comparable  Canadian programs,  are unlikely to  cause problems  in Canada,  because
most  Canadian  farmers  recognize  that  they also  benefit  from  the  price  enhancing
11See,  for example, a series of USDA/ERS  papers to appear in the  1990's subsequent to directives  in the  1990 U.S.
agricultural  legislation, and cited and summarized  in  Mercier and Hyberg.
2Care must be taken, in making such comparisons,  to recognize that part of the "Canadian premium" may derive
from  factors  other  than  the Canadian  grain's superior  consistency/reliability,  such  as Canada's  provision  of
carefully scheduled,  "just on time"  delivery  for clients with limited  storage capacity, the obligatory cleaning of
Canadian  grain prior  to export,  or  even possibly  the ability  of the  CWB  to  price  up where  it appears that a
foreign state purchasing  agency has a (relatively price-inelastic)  "Canadian  quota"  as part of its  supply diversi-
fication policy.
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effect  of the lower U.S. production which these programs bring.  Moreover,  such poli-
cies tend to be decoupled from both market prices and production decisions, creating
fewer inequities requiring harmonization.
In the  pork and  beef areas, both  countries'  producers  express  concerns  from
time to time about each others'  sanitary restrictions  on live animal trade and border
inspection procedures.  Canadian  and  (some)  U.S.  producers also seek a recognition
of equivalency  in  grading  such that  imported  meat  could  be  given  the  importing
country's grades (Hayes and Kerr,  1997). However,  in general, recent years have wit-
nessed cooperative bilateral relations between  pork and beef producers, and the two
countries' policy regimes are working harmoniously in these areas.
A key Mexican  irritant in recent years for Canadian  oilseed interests  has been
the high  rate of duty on imports of canola  oil (in the order of $45/tonne).  Coupled
with a relatively low duty on seed imports, this serves  as a significant protection for
the Mexican  crushing  sector.  More  importantly,  acting  in parallel  with similar pro-
tection in Japan,  it creates a situation where foreign seed buyers can bid up the price
of  seed  and  erode  domestic  crushing  margins  in  Canada  (although  benefiting
Canadian  growers).  However,  time will  solve  this  problem  as  Mexico's  tariffs  on
products  from  its NAFTA  partners  are gradually reduced  to zero.  Another  issue  of
current concern for Canada  is Mexico's administration  of its barley tariff rate quotas
(TRQs), which, in the main, limits Canada's exports to malting barley. Canada would
like to be allocated the unused part of the U.S.'s barley TRQ into Mexico.
OPPORTUNITIES  FOR  FURTHER  HARMONIZATION
At the  outset,  it may be  important  to  recognize  that  the subject  is  harmoni-
zation  among  unequals.  The  U.S.  market  is  relatively  more  important  to  the
Canadian  producer than  vice versa.  In plurilateral  negotiations,  the bigger  players
tend  to  call the  shots.  Whether  or  not  it  is  'fair'  or  'just',  the  reality  may  be  that
Canada and Mexico  may need harmonization  more than the United States does, and
may have to be prepared  to move further to get it. Consequently, the  'opportunities'
for  further harmonization  we have  identified  below would generally  involve  more
actions on the Canadian  side than on the U.S. side.
Multilateral  Trade Negotiations. Both  countries  have  several  common  interests
which could be pursued  in a future  round of multilateral  trade negotiations.  These
include  the elimination of export subsidies,  and the "blue box"  policies permitted  in
the Uruguay Round Agreement  (URA). Committing to abstain from the use of export
subsidies and  "direct payments under production-limiting programs"  would lock in
some of the policy changes already  operational  in both countries, thus increasing the
permanency  of  current  progress  towards  harmonization  in  some  policy  areas.
Tightening  the  "green box"  criteria would  result in more common  interpretation  of
the  requirements  of this box,  and,  consequently, less  variability  of green  programs
that may  be  introduced  in different  countries  in the future.  Further  reductions  in
tariff levels vis-a-vis  third  countries  will normally  result  in  more  Canadian/U.S./
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Mexican  consistency  in such  tariffs,  where  they are not already  equal.  There  is also
scope  for achieving  strengthened  disciplines on TRQ  administration,  and  more con-
sistency in NAFTA country practices  in this regard.
Minimum Producer  Price Mechanisms. The  U.S.  and  Canadian  governments  could
collaborate in the  setting of consistent  "loan rates"  and  "initial  prices,"  respectively.
Since  U.S.  loan rates  are  legislatively  established  and  would  require  congressional
action  to  change,  and  Congress  might  reject  such  a  loss  of  sovereignty  as  unac-
ceptable,  a similar outcome could be achieved if Canada would announce a policy of
adopting initial prices consistent with prevailing U.S. loan prices, and  matching any
subsequent  U.S.  adjustments.  The  knowledge  that  Canada  was  applying  such  a
policy would inevitably  be  taken into  consideration  by U.S. decision-makers  when
choosing their own loan rates.
There  would  appear to  be clear benefits  to the  Canadian  government in  con-
fining  its guarantee  of initial  prices  to  essentially  the same  as the  U.S. government
now  provides  under  its  loan  program-namely,  a  low-slung,  market-linked  floor
support  to  effective  producer  prices.  The  current  'price signal'  role  of initial  prices
could be taken over entirely by the "forecast  pool returns"  now offered regularly by
the  CWB.  Similarly,  leaving  decisions  on  advance  payment  levels,  and  the  risk
involved,  entirely  to  the  CWB,  would  be  a significant contribution  to reducing  the
perceptions  of government control, and of lack of risk in the market place,  in the eyes
of  CWB  critics.  Such  changes  could  be  made  under  the  enabling  legislation  of
Bill C-4, now before Canadian  Parliament.
CWB Pooling/Pricing  to Producers. As  already  discussed,  events  over  time  are
reducing  the  need for  pooling.  Assuming  pooling will not be abandoned,  however,
the  CWB  could  explore  the  use  of different  payment  mechanisms.  For  example,  it
might purchase  its grain  on similar terms to private sector firms, perhaps at a slight
discount  but with  a much higher  up-front payment to farmers  than at present,  and
pay out an  additional  "cooperative  dividend,"  if any,  at the  end of the season.  This
would give the perception of its having to assume a level of risk much more compa-
rable  to  the  private  sector  grain  marketing  companies.  Such  pricing  mechanisms
would  be similar  to those  used by some  cooperatives  in the United  States,  making
Canadian  pricing practices more consistent with those of  U.S.  farmer  cooperatives.
The  1996  (Canadian)  Western  Grains Marketing Panel  proposed several  other ways
in which more flexibility could and should be built into the CWB pricing mechanism,
including the possibilities  of making cash purchases  (e.g., under contracts  referenced
on spot or futures prices on the Minneapolis  Grain Exchange),  of paying farmers for
grain storage,  of closing pools earlier, and of allowing farmers to cash out of pools or
to trade negotiable  pool certificates.
CWB Government Links and Transparency.  By  appointing  its  Commissioners,  the
responsible  Canadian  minister still retains  effective  control  over the  CWB.  Bill  C-4
proposes certain  changes  to its administrative structure which would  phase in some
election  of directors  by  producers,  without  relinquishing  effective  control  for  the
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into  a  true  cooperative,  accountable  fully  and  only  to  its  members,  and  with  all
directors  elected  and  a  Chief Executive  appointed  by  them.  Such  changes  would
establish a governing structure more comparable to those of U.S. agricultural  coope-
ratives,  alleviating  questions  about  the  effective  control of the  CWB.  It seems rea-
sonable  to assume that  international  concerns  about  transparency  would be  much
less of an issue if the CWB was transformed into a true cooperative and ties with the
Government were cut.  Domestic suppliers'  concerns about  CWB accountability  and
transparency can be expected to continue  to grow.
CWB Monopoly. The  obligation  for  Western  Canadian wheat  and barley producers
to market through the CWB will, for as long as it lasts, cause the Board to continue  to
be perceived to be a state trading enterprise,  and remain subject to international  (par-
ticularly U.S.)  criticism and pressure. There is already considerable domestic pressure
within  Canada  in  the  direction  of reducing  or  removing  the  CWB  monopoly. The
Western  Grains Marketing Panel  recommended  (1996)  that feed barley  be removed
from CWB exclusivity. Polls seem to indicate that a majority of farmers prefer a "dual
marketing"  option  of being able  to supply  the  CWB  or to market  privately. Many
farmers have already challenged the Board's authority, in court and in other ways.  In
1998,  a Manitoba  Court of Appeal  found  that, contrary  to popular  belief,  the  CWB
was not obliged  to get the best price for farmers,  and that it  "owes them no duty of
care"  13
The Western Grains Marketing Panel  (1996)  effectively proposed that the CWB
monopoly  could be changed  to a monopoly  on the  use of existing Canadian  wheat
grades, which would continue to be subject to varietal controls.  This would allow the
CWB to continue to service clients who sought the top quality bread wheats and the
high level of intraseasonal  consistency which the current system provides. But such a
change would also allow producers who so  choose to grow unlicensed wheat varie-
ties and sell the grain to private sector buyers.  Such a system would imply the need
for  careful  segregation  of  'identity-preserved'  CWB  wheat  and  differently-graded
other wheat at all stages in the elevation,  transport and  export system.  This may  be
facilitated  by the large increases  in  Canadian elevator  capacity  currently underway,
and by the more frequent  use of containers as a grain transportation mode.
It seems likely that, in the event that it lost its wheat export monopoly  status,
some international customers would continue to prefer to do business with the CWB,
and that it would at least retain its business in the lucrative Japanese market, as well
as others. This  should make it attractive as a marketer of choice  for many Canadian
farmers.  Consideration could also be given to making the  CWB services available  to
U.S. farmers, particularly in northern tier states, who were willing to grow Canadian-
licensed varieties for the  CWB under contract.  CGC services  could also be provided
to  such farmers.  The  U.S.  could cooperate  in removing  any obstacles  to such  prac-
tices. Such actions would help the CWB to remain viable,  perhaps at a smaller scale of
operations,  even after such a loss of monopoly status.
13This finding  was part of a decision  brought down  by Justrie C. Huband  in  the case  of M-J  Farms  Enterprises
Ltd.,  reported September  29,  1997.
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Grain Grades and Standards. The question must be asked whether for grains, just as
for red meats,  a national  grading system  will ultimately be needed.  With increasing
use of buyer specifications  of particular end-use  characteristics,  there is alternatively
the  possibility  of  private  sector  third  parties  providing  a  testing  service  as,  for
example,  in  France. Assuming,  however,  that there  is  a perceived  need  for national
grain grading to continue,  it would seem  to be highly desirable for both countries to
cooperate  in  developing  a common grain grading  system which  sought to improve
the consistency  and  reliability  of the  current  U.S. system,  but which,  in  Canada  (at
least for non-CWB grains),  replaced visual assessment with a  practical,  low cost and
scientifically objective grain testing procedure to provide standardized  specifications
of key attributes  including  moisture,  gluten and protein content.  Several  tests not in
widespread  use  are  understood  to  already  exist.  With adequate  research  funding,
including contributions  from both sides,  it seems inconceivable  that modern  science
and engineering  would  not be equal to  the task  of developing  practical procedures
applicable  at  a  reasonable  cost.  Mercier  and  Hyberg  (1995)  point  to  the  potential
advantages  of  including  important  intrinsic  (end-use)  characteristics  as  grade-
determining  factors, or at least providing inspection  certificates which describe accu-
rately the status of the grain  in terms of these characteristics  and based  on objective
tests.
In summary, we would advocate the full harmonization  of U.S. and Canadian
'off-Board'  grading standards,  and thus would go further than the Canada-U.S. Joint
Commission on Grains  (1995).  The recommendation  of the latter for standardization
of  grading  methodology  (sampling  procedures,  moisture  measurement,  protein
measurement)  would  seem, however,  to be  a bare  minimum requirement.  The two
official  agencies-the  Grain  Inspection,  Packers  and  Stockyards  Administration
(GIPSA)  and the CGC-have  been reported to be collaborating  towards this end for
several years.
IMPLICATIONS  OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE  IN THE AGRI-FOOD  SYSTEM
The  global  integration  of national  economies  and  the  subsequent  harmoni-
zation  of  agricultural  policies  are  occurring  at  the  same  time  that  the  agri-food
system is undergoing a  "quiet revolution"  that is changing the economic structure of
industries throughout the system. Many  of the changes occurring  in the food system
are partly  caused  by,  and  reinforcing  of,  the  changes  in policy  caused  by harmoni-
zation.  These  changes  will  in  turn  raise new  issues  in  policy  harmonization  in the
future.
The changes  occurring in the food system  are a result of changes  in consumer
demands and  changes  in  the  system's capacity  to fulfill  those  demands.  Consumer
demands  are changing to reflect  a greater demand for food  ingredients with specific
quality  characteristics.  A  greater  emphasis  on  freshness,  nutritional  quality,  con-
sistency,  convenience,  and variety at the retail  level creates  a farm-level  demand for
commodities with specific  ingredient  characteristics necessary  to produce foods that
satisfy the demands  of consumers.
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The Driving Force of the Changing Consumer. Much of the change in the food system
is driven  by the  rising  demand  for convenience  by  consumers.  With  the  changing
family  and  work structure  of  many families,  and  particularly  with the  rising  eco-
nomic  value  of  the  time  of  women  working  outside  the  home,  consumers  are
demanding  a higher level of preparation,  combined  with a high level  of quality. In
the  United  States,  for  example,  nearly  sixty  percent  of  working-age  women  are
employed  outside  the  home,  with  mothers  tending  to  have  the  highest  levels  of
employment outside the home. Changes in family structure reinforce this trend, with
two  major  groups-unmarried  singles  living  alone  and  single-parent  families-
representing the fastest growing portions of the U.S. population (Mogelonsky,  1995).
These  trends  suggest that  the economic  value  of time for food  consumers  is
rising,  with  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  time  used  to  shop  for  and  prepare  food
becoming prohibitive  for many consumers. This reality is reflected  in the rising pro-
portion of meals  consumed away from home or purchased in prepared form for con-
sumption at home. Americans spend nearly 50 percent of their food expenditures on
food  consumed  away  from home  (representing  nearly 37  percent  of the  total food
consumed).  In perhaps the most telling indication  of the time stress faced  by many
consumers, a recent  retail industry survey found that 70 percent of Americans do not
know what they will have for their evening meal at 4:00  p.m. in the afternoon  (Food
Institute,  1998).  When  food  purchasing  decisions are  made on-the-run,  it becomes
obvious why the food retailing industry now views itself as being a direct competitor
with  the  food  service  industry  in providing  prepared  meals  to consumers.  To  do
otherwise  would  forfeit  an  even  larger  share  of  food  sales  to  the  food  service
industry Such patterns are observed in many countries as the economic development
process  proceeds  (Heijbroek,  1995).  In  Mexico,  for  example,  single  people,  higher
income people,  and working women tend to consume  more meals  away from home
(Food Marketing Institute,  1995).
Even  the  fundamental  notion  of food  retailing  as a  physical  location where
consumers must go to buy food  is being challenged  by the rising demand for conve-
nience.  On-line  grocery  shopping is  now available  by internet  in many  U.S.  cities,
and, while the success of these firms has been limited,  industry analysts believe that
such shopping services will serve a significant portion-probably the higher-income
portion of the  population that is highly desired by food firms-in the next  10  years,
with  a consensus  forecast  by  industry  analysts  suggesting  that  20 percent  of  U.S.
grocery  sales  will  be sold  through  electronic  transactions  by  2008  (Food  Institute,
1996 and  1997).
Combined  with  this  demand  for  convenience  is  a  demand  for  variety  and
quality that creates  an  intense pressure  within the food  industry  to provide  a con-
tinuing supply of products  and services  that satisfy consumers'  desires. This results
from an increasing ethnic diversity (Mogelonsky; Senauer, et al) and from consumers'
desire  to experience  new  foods  (Pierson  and Allen,  1993).  New food  product intro-
ductions in the United States have averaged  15,000  items in recent years, though the
success  rate  of  those  introductions  remains  minuscule.  This  demand  for  variety
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suggests that the derived demand  at the farm level for food ingredients that provide
specific characteristics  essential to the production of specific food products  will con-
tinue to increase.
Industry Responses  to the Changing Consumer. At the same time that changing con-
sumer  demands  require  farm  products  with  increasingly  specific  characteristics,
changes  in  technology  are permitting input suppliers  to  develop  plants that supply
those  ingredient  characteristics  (Barkema,  Drabenstott,  and  Welch,  1991).  Genetic
modification  of  plants  to  provide  pest  protection  is  now  commonplace,  with
20 percent  of corn  acreage,  30  percent  of soybean  acreage,  and  50 percent  of cotton
acreage  in  the  United  States  being planted  to  genetically  modified  seeds  (Kilman,
1998).
These  developments  remain  unrelated to  the  final characteristics  of the  crop,
however, with additional new products  that supply the characteristics  demanded  by
end-users just  beginning  to  emerge  from  laboratories.  Seeds  that  are  modified  to
contain  specific  levels  of oil,  starch,  or  protein,  specific  amino  acids  are  emerging
(Phillips,  1994). These may be followed by plants that are designed for specific indus-
trial uses or the production of industrial or pharmaceutical  chemicals. One  industry
forecast  sees  the current  genetically  engineered  products  as the  first wave  of "crop
protection traits," to be followed by the introduction of plants designed  for their crop
quality  traits  (end  use  characteristics),  followed  by  productivity-enhancing  agro-
nomic improvements and, within fifteen years,  the introduction  of plants designed as
inputs for industrial products (Looker,  1998).
A Second  Generation of Harmonization Issues. The  changes  occurring  at  both  the
retail  level and the farm input supply level of the food  system will  be accompanied
by changes in the marketing institutions in the grain, oilseed and livestock industries.
Open market production,  guided by price determination in spot and futures markets
will  be  replaced,  in  many  cases,  by  contractual  relationships  that  determine  pro-
duction  practices,  establish  delivery  schedules  and  locations,  and  protect  the
property rights of the investors in new seed technologies.  Policies and pricing institu-
tions based  on an assumption of homogeneous  commodities,  including  such funda-
mental  policy  tools  as  U.S.  loan  rates,  may  be  unable  to  provide  the  information-
intensive  coordination  functions  required  in  a  grain  sector  driven  by  end-user
demands.  In some  cases,  institutional harmonization  may come  as  a private  sector
initiative led by seed supply firms (perhaps better called  "genetic information supply
firms"),  agri-food manufacturers  and retailers (perhaps better called "end-user infor-
mation  supply  firms")  and  grain  handling  firms  (perhaps  better  called  "logistical
information supply firms").  These firms will  own the  three essential  forms of infor-
mation needed to operate a grain marketing channel  in the emerging food system.
These  changes  also  suggest  that  recent  efforts  at  harmonization,  though
important,  are  likely  to  soon  give  way  to  a  "second  generation"  of harmonization
issues.  These  issues will  focus on three  areas.  First,  intellectual  property rights,  and
an  ability to protect  intellectual property  rights, will  be central  to the functioning  of
the emerging grain sector.  Second, property rights over other forms of information-
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such  as  information  derived  from  on-farm  application  of  genetically  engineered
products  and  collected  through  Global  Positioning  and  Geographic  Information
Systems-will determine the ability of firms to capture the return on their investment
in genetically modified plants. Third, contract law, and its application to vertical rela-
tionships among  firms, will govern the institutional  structure in which vertical  alli-
ances will be formed. These areas of policy, while not completely new to agricultural
policymakers,  will  require  a  dramatic  broadening  of  the  policy  agenda to  include
areas  of law  far beyond  the  price-based  policies  that have  dominated  agricultural
policy discussions  in recent years.
CONCLUSIONS
There has already been considerable progress in recent years in U.S./Mexico/
Canada  policy harmonization  in the  grain-livestock  sub-sector.  In the livestock  area
and  for many crops,  including  oilseeds and  the minor cereals,  there  are no serious
policy  disharmonies between  the Unites  States and  Canada.  Wheat and barley pose
the key remaining problems.
Conventional wisdom in the Western Canadian grain sector seems to be that if
the  CWB's monopoly is removed  it will not survive domestic competitive pressures.
We conclude  that if the CWB's monopoly is not removed  it will not survive domestic
and international  political pressure.  If both are  correct,  it follows that the CWB will
not  survive  either  way. However,  we  suspect  that  the  CWB  could  continue  to be
viable, perhaps at a reduced  scale of operations, even with the loss of its monopoly
status.  The  1996  recommendation  of the  Western  Grains  Marketing  Panel  to  allow
Canadian  farmers  the flexibility  to grow unlicensed  varieties and  sell to the private
trade, and to confine the CWB monopoly to the marketing  of wheat using the tradi-
tional Canadian  "appellations,"  should be adopted by the Canadian government.
Both  countries should  devote  significant  resources  to the  development  of  a
practical,  scientifically  objective  and  mutually  acceptable  grain  measurement  tech-
nique and grading system  (the latter to be applicable to off-Board wheat in Canada's
case).  The  objective  here  should  be  to  improve  consistency  and  reliability  of the
current  U.S. system  while  avoiding the need for visually distinguished  grades  and
licensing.
Canada  should coordinate  its initial payments levels with the prevailing U.S.
loan rates so as to ensure the  same levels  of minimum effective  producer  price gua-
rantee for major grains in both countries.
Changes  in consumer demands and technology  will raise a new set of policy
harmonization issues. These issues will range far beyond  the price policy issues that
have dominated  the agricultural policy agenda in recent years and will determine the
institutional structure of agri-food markets.
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